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by Paul C. Rosenthal* 
Kathleen Weaver Cannon** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The bifurcated investigatory roles of the Department of Commerce and the 
International Trade Commission (lTC or Commission) make antidumping and 
countervailing duty proceedings complex. The two agencies have separate in-
vestigatory mandates under Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended 
(the Act),! but the investigation of each agency is triggered by the other's 
decision. The role of the Court of International Trade (CIT) in reviewing the 
agencies' decisions has raised the question of what happens when the CIT 
overturns a decision of one agency if the second agency's action is dependent 
upon the first. That problem is compounded when the agency whose decision 
has been reversed decides to appeal the CIT's decision to the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit (CAFC). While the agency that is appealing the CIT's 
decision proceeds with the appeal, what does the other agency do? What is the 
CIT's role in this investigatory ping-pong game? 
This Article will address the issue presented when an ITC preliminary neg-
ative i~ury determination is reversed by the CIT, and the Commission decides 
to appeal the CIT's decision. Is the Commerce Department obligated to resume 
its preliminary investigation while the lTC's appeal is pending? Absent a stay 
pending appeal, the answer should be an unqualified yes. The Commerce 
• Partner, Collier, Shannon, Rill & Scott, Washington, D.C.; B.A. 1972, University of California, 
Berkeley; J.D. 1975, University of California, Davis . 
•• Associate, Collier, Shannon, Rill & Scott, Washington, D.C.; B.S. 1977, University of Maryland; 
J.D. 1981, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. 
I Title VII of the Trade Act of 1930, as amended, represents congressional implementation of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) principles on the conduct of antidumping and 
countervailing duty investigations. Title VII was added to the Trade Act of 1930 by the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, 150. Title VII is codified at 19 U.S.C. 
§§ 1671-1673 (1982) as "Subtitle IV-Countervailing and Antidumping Duties." [Hereinafter refer-
ences to Title VII will be cited to the relevant United States Code section.] Title VII establishes a 
bifurcated procedure whereby the Department of Commerce determines whether unfair trade prac-
tices exist, while the International Trade Commission determines whether a U.S. industry is injured 
by the unfair practices. 
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Department, however, has refused to proceed with its investigation in such 
circumstances. 
The Commerce Department's refusal to investigate violates the statute and 
undermines the Court of International Trade's authority. In essence, the De-
partment has decided that final judgments of the CIT need not be heeded 
unless and until they are upheld by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 
The government's failure to follow lower court judgments not only breeds 
disrespect for the CIT's decisions but also delays relief to the successful plaintiff 
in direct contravention of the congressional intent that relief in dumping and 
subsidy actions be provided expeditiously.2 
II. THE DUAL INVESTIGATORY ROLES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND 
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION 
An examination of the timetable of events set forth In the Act for 
antidumping3 and countervailing duty4 investigations reveals the bifurcated but 
highly interconnected procedural relationship of the Commerce Department 
and the U.S. International Trade Commission. Decisions by the Commerce 
Department trigger investigations at the lTC, and decisions of the Commission 
compel further action by the Commerce Department. 
Assume, for example, that petitions alleging both dumping and subsidization 
of imports are filed simultaneously with the Department of Commerce and the 
International Trade Commission. Within twenty days of receiving the petitions, 
the Commerce Department must make a decision about whether to initiate 
antidumping and countervailing duty investigations.5 If the Commerce Depart-
ment does not accept the petitions on the twentieth day from the filing date, 
the ITC does not proceed with its preliminary injury determination.6 
If, on the other hand, the Commerce Department decides affirmatively to 
initiate the investigations on day twenty, this decision triggers two actions. First, 
the ITC must, within forty-five days from the date the petition was filed, issue 
preliminary injury determinations.' Second, the Commerce Department must 
proceed with investigations of the allegations regarding dumping and subsidies 
and must issue preliminary determinations by the one hundred sixtieth day 
after the date on which the petition was filed in a dumping case and the eighty-
2 S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 245 (1979). 
319 U.s.C. § 1673 (1982). 
419 U.S.c. § 1671 (1982). 
5 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a, 1673a (1982). 
619 U.S.C. §§ 1671b(a), 1673b(a) (1982). 
719 U.S.C. §§ 1671b(a), 1673b(a) (1982). 
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fifth day after the date on which the petition was filed in a countervailing duty 
investigation.8 
If the ITC decides by day forty-five that there is no reasonable indication of 
injury or threat of injury, the antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings 
end.9 The Commerce Department will respond to the negative ITC preliminary 
injury determinations by terminating its investigations. Conversely, if the ITC 
preliminary determinations are affirmative, then the Commerce Department's 
investigations continue through to a final determination. lO 
The Commerce Department's affirmative final determinations of dumping 
and subsidies trigger final injury investigations and determinations by the ITC.II 
If the lTC's investigations yield affirmative injury determinations, then the 
Commerce Department must publish antidumping and countervailing duty 
orders.12 On the other hand, if either the Commerce Department or the ITC 
reach a negative final determination, the investigation is terminated and no 
further action is taken by the other agency. 13 
Aside from the complexity of the investigatory scheme, two underlying 
themes emerge from a review of the statute. First, Congress was concerned 
about undue delay in the investigations and therefore set strict time deadlines 
for agency action.14 Second, the procedural schedule devised by Congress shows 
a clear legislative intent that certain decisions by one agency trigger an investi-
gation and resulting decision (either preliminary or final, depending upon the 
stage of investigation) by the other agency. The Commerce Department and 
the lTC, while investigating very different aspects of the unfair trade laws, 
work in tandem procedurally in reaching each determination. That a determi-
nation by one agency is conditioned on a decision of the other, and in turn 
triggers certain, statutorily required actions by the other,15 is an important 
consideration in analyzing the Commerce Department's refusal to take action 
following a court order reversing an ITC determination. 
819 V.S.C. §§ 1673b(b). 167Ib(b) (1982). 
919 V.S.C. §§ 167Ib(a). 1673b(a) (1982). 
10 19 V.S.C. §§ 167Ib(a). 1673b(a) (1982). 
II 19 V.S.C. §§ 167Id(b). 1673d(b) (1982). 
12 19 V.S.C. §§ 167Id(c)(2). 1673d(c)(2). 1671e. 1673e (1982). 
13 Congress has set forth in some detail the kinds of agency decisions that are subject to judicial 
review. While there are exceptions. generally agency decisions that have the effect of terminating the 
investigation are subject to review whenever such determinations take place. See 19 V.S.C. § 1516a 
(1982). 
14 See. e.g .• S. REp. No. 249. 96th Cong .• 1st Sess. 66 (1979); H.R. REP. No. 317. 96th Cong .• 1st 
Sess. 62 (1979). 
15 The statute provides that following a negative preliminary determination by the ITC. "the inves-
tigation shall be terminated." 19 V.S.C. § 167Ib(a) (1982) and 19 V.S.C. § 1673b(a) (1982) (emphasis 
added). Following an affirmative preliminary determination. the Commerce Department "shall make 
a determination .... " 19 V.S.C. § 167Ib(b) (1982) and 19 V.S.C. § 1673b(b) (1982) (emphasis added). 
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III. CIT REVERSAL OF ITC NEGATIVE PRELIMINARY DETERMINATIONS 
Under the statutory scheme outlined above, the Department of Commerce 
must continue its investigation when the ITC issues an affirmative preliminary 
injury determination. If the ITC preliminary determination is negative, how-
ever, the investigation by the Commerce Department is terminated. What hap-
pens when the lTC's negative preliminary determination is reversed by the 
Court of International Trade and the CIT's final decision is then appealed to 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit? 
That issue has presented itself in three recent cases. In each of those cases, 
the ITC followed the order of the CIT on remand and issued a preliminary, 
affirmative determination. That affirmative determination was presented to and 
approved by the CIT. Thereupon, the ITC decided to appeal the CIT's decision 
to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Despite the issuance of an 
affirmative preliminary determination by the Commission, however, the Com-
merce Department refused in all three cases to recommence its investigation or 
to issue its preliminary determination as required by statute, pending resolution 
of the appeal. 
A. Armstrong Rubber Co. 
In Armstrong Rubber Co. v. United States l6 the plaintiffs asked the CIT to hold 
certain officials of the Commerce Department in contempt of court for refusing 
to resume an investigation into whether radial ply tires from the Republic of 
Korea were being sold at less than fair value. Plaintiff's contempt action followed 
a judgment by the court reversing a preliminary negative ITC determination,17 
The court found that the ITC applied an erroneous legal standard and re-
manded the matter to the ITC for the issuance of a determination in accordance 
with the CIT's decision. IS Following the lTC's issuance of its affirmative prelim-
inary determination, the Commerce Department refused to'resume its dumping 
investigation. In a separate opinion in the same case, the court denied the 
defendants' motion for a stay pending appeal,19 
In response to plaintiffs' contempt motion, the CIT stated: "Although it was 
within the contemplation of the court that the judgment it was issuing would 
lead to the resumption of the investigation by the Department of Commerce, 
the court did not say so specifically .... "20 The court felt that "the awesome 
16 No. 86-15, slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade, Feb. 14, 1986), 
17 Armstrong Rubber Co. v. United States, 614 F. Supp. 1252 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), overturning 
the lTC's decision in Radial Ply Tires for Passenger Cars From The Republic of Korea, Inv. No. 731-TA-
200 (Preliminary), USITC Pub. 1572 (1984). 
18 [d. 
19 No. 85-109, slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade, Oct. 18, 1985). 
20 No. 86-15, slip op. at 2. 
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power of contempt is not to be used unless the party said to be in contempt has 
been given a clear direction by the Court."21 Although declining to grant the 
motion for contempt, the CIT nonetheless made it clear that "the court expected 
its judgments with respect to erroneous fTC determinations (determinations which had 
the effect of terminating investigations) to lead inexorably to the continuation of the 
investigations by the Commerce Department . ... "22 
B. Jeannette Sheet Glass 
Similarly, in Jeannette Sheet Glass Corp. v. United States23 the Department of 
Commerce refused to proceed with its dumping investigation, despite the is-
suance of an ITC preliminary affirmative determination. The ITC issued its 
affirmative determination as a result of a remand from the CIT reversing a 
negative preliminary determination. The CIT affirmed the new determination, 
and the ITC appealed the CIT's holding. Thus, at the point of the lTC's filing 
of the appeal, a new, affirmative preliminary ITC finding was in effect. The 
Commerce Department, however, refused to recommence its dumping investi-
gation, essentially ignoring the new ITC determination. 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) dismissed the lTC's 
appeal of the CIT's decision. Its opinion suggested that an appeal at that point 
was untimely since the CIT's order was not final. 24 Upon a motion for recon-
sideration by the government, the Federal Circuit reconfirmed its dismissal of 
the lTC's appeal, suggesting that the CAFC was waiting for the lower court to 
issue a final order. After the case was again sent back to the CIT, the ITC 
moved, and the CIT agreed, to vacate the CIT's decision because that decision 
was based at least in part on a case that had subsequently been reversed by the 
appellate court.25 During the lTC's round trip journey to the CAFC, the Com-
merce Department maintained its refusal to continue its investigation.26 
21 Id. at 3. The CIT also noted that the plaintiff had commenced a separate action to compel the 
Department of Commerce to resume the investigation, acknowledging that the substance of the dispute 
regarding an action by the Department of Commerce would be reached in the new action. 
22 !d. at 2 (emphasis added). 
23 607 F. Supp. 123 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985). The case arose out of a negative preliminary ITC decision 
in Thin Sheet Glass from Switzerland, Belgium, and the Federal Republic of Germany, Inv. Nos. 731-
TA-127, 128 and 129 (Preliminary), USITC Pub. 1376 (May 1983). 
24 Appeal Nos. 86-519 and 86-700 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
25 Jeannette Sheet Glass v. United States, No. 87-4, slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade, Jan. 9, 1987). The 
decision in jeannette Sheet Glass relied, in part, on the holding in Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 
that a finding of injury to a domestic industry must follow a so-called "reasonable indication" standard. 
591 F. Supp. 640 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984). This holding in Republic Steel was reversed by the Federal 
Circuit in American Lamb Co. v. United States. 785 F.2d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
26 Plaintiffs in jeannette Sheet Glass filed an application for declaratory judgment, a writ of mandamus, 
and an order to show cause to compel the Commerce Department to recommence its investigation 
under section 733(b) of the Act. 19 U.S.c. § 1673b(b) (1982). That action was filed in October of 1985, 
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C. Bingham & Taylor 
The most recent case to present the issue of the Commerce Department's 
responsibility to recommence an investigation when the ITC appeals a reversal 
of its negative preliminary determination is Bingham & Taylor Div., Virginia 
Industries v. United States. 27 Following a CIT decision reversing the Commission's 
negative injury determination, the Commission found a reasonable indication 
that imports of light construction castings from Brazil materially injure or 
threaten to materially injure a domestic industry. The Commission's revised 
determination on the Bingham & Taylor remand was published in the Federal 
Register on April 9, 1986.28 
Despite a written request by plaintiffs, the Commerce Department refused to 
recommence its investigation following the lTC's published notice of its affir-
mative preliminary injury determination. The Commerce Department stated 
that no further action would be taken, despite publication of the ITC affirmative 
preliminary determination, because it was the Department's belief that the 
results of the CIT remand were not final. 29 The Department asserted that the 
original ITC negative determination was in effect pending "a final court decision 
adjudicating the legality of that determination."30 
On March 31, 1987, the CAFC affirmed the CIT's holding in Bingham & 
Taylor, thereby sustaining the affirmative preliminary determination.31 The 
Commerce Department's preliminary determination was issued June 15, 1987-
a delay of two years from the date the petition was filed. 32 
D. Summary 
Thus, the court has on three occasions been presented with the opportunity 
to order the Commerce Department to commence an investigation following 
reversal of a preliminary negative ITC decision. Despite the court's strong 
statement in the Armstrong case that it expected its judgments reversing ITC 
determinations "to lead inexorably to the continuation of the investigations by 
the Commerce Department,"33 the Court of International Trade has not yet 
taken the initiative to order the Commerce Department to continue its investi-
but was not decided prior to the Court's reversal of jeannette Sheet Glass on the merits. Therefore, the 
dismissal of the suit at the CIT level rendered the issue moot. 
27 627 F. Supp. 793 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986). 
28 50 Fed. Reg. 12,217 (1986). 
29 Letter from G. Kaplan, Dept. of Commerce, Int'l Trade Administration, to P. Rosenthal (Septem-
ber 15, 1986). 
'" [d. 
31 Appeal No. 86-1440 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 31, 1987). 
32 Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty De:ermination, Certain Light Iron Construction 
Castings from Brazil, 52 Fed. Reg. 25,322 (1987). 
33 No. 86-15, slip op. at 2 (emphasis added). 
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gation. Given the CIT's belief that such decisions should unquestionably lead 
to continued Commerce Department investigations, and given the Commerce 
Department's equally clear refusal to take action continuing its investigations in 
these circumstances, this issue is one which needs to be resolved. 
IV. THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT'S REFUSAL TO INVESTIGATE 
The plain terms of the statute indicate that under sections 703(b) and 773(b) 
of the Act, when the Commission renders an affirmative preliminary determi-
nation, the Commerce Department must investigate and preliminarily deter-
mine whether the imported product is being subsidized or dumped in the 
United States.S4 Because an appeal of the Commission's preliminary affirmative 
injury determination does not operate to stay the court's decision or the Com-
mission's decision, the Commerce Department has a mandatory duty to conduct 
an investigation and render a preliminary determination. 
It is well settled that under federal law the "pendency of an appeal does not 
suspend the operation of a final judgment for purposes of collateral estoppel, 
except where appellate review constitutes a trial de novo . ... "35 The mere filing 
of an appeal from the court's decision does not provide an automatic stay of 
judgment. 
The instant controversy is unique, and hence does not compare easily with 
other administrative law scenarios, in that two U.S. government agencies-with 
interdependent functions-are simultaneously compelled to act by a single court 
order. If there are no questions or complications attached to the responsibilities 
of the ITC following remand from the CIT, then a redetermination must be 
issued by the ITC. Because the Commerce Department is a separate adminis-
trative agency from the lTC, however, it is the Commerce Department's belief 
that its responsibilities upon remand are somehow distinguishable from those 
of the ITC. 
Thus, despite the existence of clear law on the need to abide by final court 
judgments during the pendency of an appeal, the Commerce Department filed 
numerous memoranda with the CIT setting forth reasons why it believes that 
it need not proceed with investigations where the ITC appealed the CIT's 
decision. 36 Although the Commerce Department does not argue that the Com-
mission's revised injury determination based upon the direction of the Court is 
34 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(b), 1673(b) (1982). 
35 Nixon v. Richey, 513 F.2d 430, 438 n.75 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (citations omitted). 
36 See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment or, Alterna-
tively, to Dismiss this Action for Lack of Jurisdiction or Failure to State a Claim for Which Relief Can 
be Granted, Jeannette Sheet Glass Corp. v. United States (No. 85-10 01485); Defendant's Reply to 
Plaintiff's Response to Motion to Affirm Agency Determination, Bingham & Taylor Div., Virginia 
Industries, Inc. v. United States (No. 85-07-00909). 
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invalid, it does suggest that the Department should not be required to reinitiate 
its investigation because the CIT's decision is not a final determination.~7 The 
Commerce Department relies upon 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(c) and (e), which provides 
that liquidation of entries must be in accordance with a final court decision in 
the action, and cites 28 U.S.C. § 2645 and the case of Melamine Chemicals, Inc. 
v. United States,~8 to explain what constitutes a final court decision for purposes 
of administering the antidumping and countervailing duty law. ~9 
A. The CIT Order as a Final Court Decision 
The government's argument that a CIT order affirming a remand determi-
nation by the ITC is not a final order is a curious one. If the determination by 
the CIT is not final, it cannot be appealed to the CAFC. If it is final, the 
Commerce Department is bound to follow it. The Commerce Department sim-
ply cannot have the argument both ways. 
Yet these contradictory claims regarding the finality of the lTC's decision are 
precisely what the Commerce Department has advanced in each of the deter-
minations discussed above. In Bingham & Taylor, for example, the U.S. govern-
ment argued that no final decision by the U.S. Court of International Trade 
existed and, hence, the Commerce Department need not recommence its in-
vestigation.40 Subsequently, the government filed an appeal of the CIT's order 
to the appellate court,citing the CIT decision as a final order. Indeed, if the 
CIT's order was not a final judgment, then the U.S. government's appeal would 
be premature and the Federal Circuit would not have had jurisdiction over the 
case. The government's attempt to treat the final judgment by the CIT as a 
final court decision for purposes of a court appeal but not for purposes of its 
effect upon an administrative agency is simply unsupportable. 
It is important to note, too, that the defendant in this and all other Title VII 
cases is the United States, not a specific agency such as the Commerce Depart-
ment or the ITC. Thus, the Commerce Department's further assertion that the 
CIT may not order the Commerce Department to take action in appeals from 
ITC decisions because the Department is not the real party-in-interest41 is 
37 See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment or, Alterna-
tively, to Dismiss this Action for Lack of Jurisdiction or Failure to State a Claim for Which Relief Can 
be Granted, Jeannette Sheet Glass Corp. v. United States (No. 85-10-01485); Defendant's Reply to 
Plaintiff's Response to Motion to Affirm Agency Determination, Bingham & Taylor Div., Virginia 
Industries, Inc. v. United States (No. 85-07-00909). 
38 561 F. Supp. 458, 464 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983), rev'd, 732 F.2d 924 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
3. Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Motion to Affirm Agency Determination, Bingham & 
Taylor (No. 85-07-00909) at 15-21. 
40Id. 
41 See, e.g., Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Motion to Affirm Agency Determination, 
Bingham & Taylor (No. 85-07-00909). 
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incorrect. The Department's argument is faulty for two reasons. First, the 
United States and not the ITC is the named defendant in the action, and second, 
under the U.S. trade laws, the CIT's judgment is clearly applicable to and 
enforceable against both of these related agencies.42 Accordingly, an order of 
the CIT should be binding on the relevant U.S. government agencies and not 
limited in applicability to one agency or the other. 
B. Court Decisions on the Finality of CIT Judgments 
The Court of International Trade and the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit both examined the question of finality of determinations issued by the 
CIT in several cases. The following discussion of each of the major cases on 
finality of CIT judgments indicates, however, that neither court has yet estab-
lished firm procedures to be followed at the agency level when appeals of CIT 
judgments are pending. An analysis of the facts and circumstances underlying 
the various court opinions on finality reveals that despite the apparent incon-
sistencies reflected in the various decisions, certain key principles have emerged 
by which courts may anticipate how agencies will treat CIT judgments pending 
resolution of the appeal. 
1. Melamine Chemicals 
The government relied heavily on the Melamine case43 to support its finality 
argument. Melamine arose as an appeal from a final negative determination by 
the Commerce Department in an antidumping investigation of imports from 
the Netherlands. The Commerce Department originally had issued a final af-
firmative determination44 but then amended that determination and published 
a negative determination.45 The Court of International Trade held that the 
Commerce Department's interpretation of a key regulation at issue was contrary 
to the statute and remanded the action to the agency.46 The court also ordered 
the agency to rescind its amended (and negative) determination that had been 
based on the challenge to the regulation.47 
The Court of International Trade stayed the remand proceeding pending 
appeal of the CIT's decision to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 
Ultimately, the CAFC reversed the holding of the Court of International Trade 
and affirmed the legality of the agency's application of the regulation at issue.48 
42 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1982). 
43 561 F. Supp. 458 (Ct. In!,1 Trade 1983), rev'd, 732 F.2d 924 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
4445 C.F.R. § 20.152 (1980). 
45 45 C.F.R. § 29.619 (1980). 
46 Melamine, 561 F. Supp. at 464. 
47 [d. 
48 732 F.2d 924 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
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Thus, in Melamine, unlike the Armstrong, jeannette and Bingham & Taylor cases 
discussed above, the agency action was stayed pending appeal.49 Moreover, in 
Melamine the Court of International Trade did not issue a final judgment 
concerning the litigation. Finally, the Melamine decision dealt with a final Com-
merce Department determination, whereas Armstrong, jeannette, and Bingham & 
Taylor each involved reversal of an ITC preliminary determination. 
Unlike Melamine, in which the agencies had completed their investigations 
entitling the prevailing parties to an order, the cases involving an ITC prelim-
inary determination entitled the petitioners only to an investigation. As the 
House Ways and Means Committee noted, "no irrevocable harm occurs to any 
party until after the agencies have completed their investigations .... "50 The 
Court of International Trade has quite properly refused to stay preliminary 
investigations pending appeal because the damage to the domestic industry is 
greater than the burden on the agency and foreign parties.51 
A major concern of the Melamine court in connection with the CIT's decision 
was the potential "yo-yo effect" on liquidations that the proposed action would 
entail.52 This concern appeared to relate specifically to the unusual fact pattern 
presented in Melamine. Given the statutory scheme for dumping and subsidy 
investigations and cases, however, the Melamine court appears unduly concerned 
with the potential yo-yo effect. A yo-yo effect, whereby a decision may change 
over the course of an investigation and a court appeal several times and affect 
the liquidation of entries, is the natural consequence of the unfair trade statutory 
scheme. A preliminary affirmative determination by the Commerce Department 
triggers the suspension of liquidation of the relevant imports; a final negative 
determination by the Commerce Department or the ITC dissolves that liqui-
dation. Reversal of either the Commerce Department or ITC decision by the 
Court of International Trade, followed by issuance of an order, once again 
requires the suspension of liquidation. 
The potential for a yo-yo effect is therefore plain in the procedural scheme 
that Congress devised. There is no indication that Congress sought to avoid 
49 Indeed, it is the authors' belief that the reason the government did not seek a stay pending appeal 
in Armstrong, jeannette Sheet Glass, and Bingham & Taylor is precisely because it realized that it would 
be unable to satisfy the requirements to obtain a stay in such circumstances. 
50 H.R. REP. No. 725, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1984). 
51 See American Grape Growers Alliance for Fair Trade v. United States, No. 85-104, slip op. at 7 
(Ct. Int'l Trade Oct. 7, 1985); Armstrong Rubber Co. v. United States, No. 85-109, slip op. (Ct. Int'l 
Trade Oct. 18, 1985). Because the CIT had also rescinded the agency's final negative determination 
in Melamine, the CAFC felt it necessary to address the CIT's "rescission." The CAFC was concerned 
about the legality of the CIT's interlocutory order concerning liquidation of entries. 732 F.2d at 934 
(Fed. Cir. 1984). The CIT's decision contemplated a remand proceeding in due course followed by 
final action by the court. 
52 See American Grape Growers, No. 85-104, slip op. at 7. 
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this changing status. Congress was well aware that injunctions were available in 
extraordinary circumstances to maintain the status quo. 
Thus, Congress clearly contemplated that in each of these instances the most 
recent decision would govern, whether that decision was reached by a court or 
by an agency. Only the issuance of a temporary injunction would alter this 
principle and result in maintenance of the status quo. There is no reason that 
the mere appeal of the CIT's decision to the Fe?eral Circuit should, in and of 
itself, dispense with the basic principles that the last decision should gO,vern, or 
that a stay should be obtained to preserve the status quo. The appellate court's 
preoccupation with the potential for varying court decisions seems inconsistent 
with the very scheme Congress devised. 
Accordingly, Melamine does not claim, and should not be interpreted, to alter 
the ordinary federal rule that final judgment by a district court is entitled to 
full effect during the pendency of an appeal and is not subject to collateral 
attack or disregard, absent the grant of a stay. To the extent Melamine is inter-
preted in this broad way, it is incorrect. 
2. American Grape Growers 
The CIT's ruling in the American Grape Growers Alliance for Fair Trade v. United 
States,53 which the CIT issued after Melamine, provides the clearest holding by 
the court concerning the actions taken following a final determination by the 
court that is later appealed. In the American Grape Growers case, the ITC at-
tempted to avoid making a redetermination pursuant to the court's order be-
cause the ITC had filed an appeal of the decision. The court refused to accept 
the restrictive reading of "final court decision" in the statute that the U.S. 
government relied upon. The court specifically rejected the government's as-
sertion that 28 U.S.C. § 2645 indicates that the CIT's judgment is not final 
where an appeal to the CAFC has been filed. The court held that the pendency 
of an appeal has no bearing on enforcement of a judgment absent receiving a 
stay of that judgment. 54 The Court noted that, under the government's inter-
pretation of the statute, "[t]he taking of an appeal would operate as an automatic 
stay, rendering all rules on the subject of stays unnecessary."55 The Court further 
5! 622 F. Supp. 295 (Ct. In!'l Trade 1985). 
54 Id. at 297. 
55Id. Interestingly, the CAFC has recently ruled that an agency appeal of a CIT remand order-
prior to conducting the remand-is premature. Badger-Powhatan v. United States, 808 F.2d 823 (Fed. 
Cir. 1986). Under Badger-Powhatan, the agency would have to conduct the remand and receive CIT 
approval of the results prior to an appeal to the CAFe. !d. at 825. Accord, Cabot Corp. v. United 
States, 788 F.2d 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Thus, the CIT remand order is not finaVappealable; only the 
approved results of the remand are appealable. Badger and Cabot plainly require the agency to act 
upon a remand order, and the results of the remand determination are as valid and binding as the 
first determination. If an ITC determination triggers action by the Commerce Department, then there 
should be no distinction between a "regular" ITC determination and a remand determination. 
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admonished the government for attempting to evade enforcement of its final 
decision, noting that "[i]f anything, the government should set an example for 
obedience to judgments of the Court."56 
Thus, while the American Grape Growers holding did not discuss the Commerce 
Department's responsibility to continue its investigation following the reversal 
of an ITC negative determination, it made clear that the government may not 
avoid enforcement of a CIT decision that has been appealed, but where no stay 
has been granted. 
3. Roses Inc. v. United States 
Interestingly, in the case of Roses Inc. v. United States,57 the Commerce De-
partment took a different approach regarding whether a CIT decision had to 
be followed absent a stay pending appeal. In Roses, the Court of International 
Trade rejected the Commerce Department's standard for initiation of dumping 
investigations. 58 Following the CIT's decision, the Commerce Department filed 
an appeal with the Federal Circuit.59 Because the Commerce Department rec-
ognizes that the CIT's order to initiate the investigation would cause the ad-
ministrative process to continue notwithstanding its appeal, the Commerce De-
partment sought a stay from the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit granted 
the Commerce Department's motion for a stay in all respects. Thus, in Roses, 
the Commerce Department recognized that the judgment of the Court of 
International Trade must control absent a stay pending appeal. Although the 
Roses decision was issued prior to Melamine, the Roses approach is still good law. 
4. Badger-Powhatan 
In Badger-Powhatan, Div. of Figgie Int'l Inc. v. United States,60 the CIT rejected 
the Commerce Department's contention that the intervenors' appeal in that case 
prevented the Commerce Department from implementing the latest final de-
termination and antidumping duty order until the CAFC had ruled on the 
matter. The court's decision disclaimed addressing the issue of whether or not 
the decision reached by the CIT may be considered a controlling final court 
decision. The court expressed doubt that Melamine applies to the entire entry 
process 61 and found that the most recent determination must govern the 
56 American Grape Growers, 622 F. Supp. at 297-98. 
57 538 F. Supp. 418 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982), a/I'd, 706 F.2d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
58 [d., interpreting 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982). By rejecting the initiation standard, the CIT reversed 
the Department's decision not to proceed. 
5. United States v. Roses, Inc., Appeal No. 82-27. 
60 638 F. Supp. 344 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986). 
61 [d. at 346. 
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amount of deposits to be made while the appeal is pending, unless a stay of the 
judgment is granted under CIT Rule 62 or otherwise.62 
5. Summary 
Both Badger-Powhatan and Melamine involved appeals of final Commerce De-
partment determinations. Neither case dealt with a preliminary negative deter-
mination by the ITC (or even the Commerce Department) that had the effect 
of terminating an otherwise mandatory investigation by the agency. While the 
case law fails to dictate firm procedures to be followed when appeals are pend-
ing, there exist several principles followed by the CIT and CAFC which prohibit 
an agency from "inferring" the existence of a stay where none has been granted. 
Those principles are as follows: 
(1) An appeal of a CIT remand order does not absolve the agency from 
actually conducting a redetermination on remand. There is no automatic stay.63 
(2) A CIT remand order is not an appealable action. The remand must be 
performed and approved by the CIT before it is appealable to the CAFC.64 
(3) When an agency believes that the continuation or implementation of a 
determination may result in irreparable harm, the agency may seek a stay of its 
effect from the court exercising jurisdiction over the appeal. 65 
One further case identifying the court's expectations as to agency actions 
following remand is significant. In Freeport Minerals Co. v. United States66 the 
Federal Circuit rejected an argument advanced by the intervenor that the 
agency's actions on remand were solely governed by the court's authority rather 
than the statutory mandates and deadlines set forth for agency action. The 
CAFC refuted the intervenor's assertion: 
This contention-in effect, that the ITA [International Trade Ad-
ministration] abandons the carefully wrought statutory scheme of 
the antidumping law once it returns to [a] case on remand ... flies 
in the face of Congress' detailed and painstaking efforts to create a 
procedurally precise and substantively valid avenue of relief for 
domestic producers confronting unfairly traded (dumped) imports. 
Certainly neither ITA nor the courts are free to abandon the sta-
tutory framework when a case is remanded.67 
The Freeport Minerals court made clear that when it remanded an action to the 
agency, it expected the agency to continue to follow the statutory deadlines to 
62/d. at 347. 
63 American Grape Growers, 622 F. Supp. at 297. 
64 Badger-Powhatan, 808 F.2d at 825. 
65Id. 
66 758 F.2d 629 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
67Id. at 636. 
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which it was subject, and that the court appeal did not eliminate those statutory 
deadlines. This basic principle should also govern the Commerce Department's 
actions following the issuance of an affirmative ITC preliminary determination 
on remand and bar the inference of an automatic stay in such circumstances. 
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
In addition to the illogic of failing to investigate following a decision by the 
CIT, and the violation of the statutory scheme and judicial holdings with respect 
to the agency's obligations following a final CIT decision, there are compelling 
policy reasons why the Commerce Department should recommence investiga-
tions following a reversal of a preliminary ITC negative determination. If the 
Department investigates only after a petitioner prevails at the CAFC, relief to 
the domestic industry will be severely delayed in a manner inconsistent with 
congressional intent. Congress was very concerned with delay in the resolution 
of judicial proceedings, as the following excerpt from the Senate Finance Com-
mittee Report on the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 indicates: 
The inclusion of provisions for interlocutory review of administer-
ing authority and U.S. International Trade Commission determi-
nations and antidumping and countervailing duty procedures is 
intended to enable a party to obtain review of administrative deter-
minations at the earliest possible opportunity so as to avoid delay. 
Any substantial delay can make an ultimate resolution of an issue 
in a party's favor irrelevant because of the irreversible damage 
suffered during the interim period.68 
In keeping with this policy of expedited reviews, it is the duty of the U.S. 
government to ensure that its investigations are not unduly delayed. Unfortu-
nately, the Commerce Department's actions in recent cases indicate an attempt 
to delay rather than expedite resolution of these cases. In addition to the 
Commerce Department's general position that it need not act while an appeal 
of a revised ITC decision is pending, the Commerce Department has set forth 
additional arguments in memoranda submitted to the CIT supporting delay of 
its investigations which raise serious doubts about the Department's commitment 
to the congressional mandates on expeditious enforcement of the unfair trade 
laws. 
68 S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 245 (1979). While the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 
narrowed the number of administrative determinations for which interlocutory appeals were available, 
the 1984 Act maintained the provision allowing juoicial review of decisions that effectively terminate 
investigations. See Section 623 of the Trade and Tarriff Act of 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 
3040-41, (codified at 19 U.S.c. § 1516a (1982)). 
1987] FINAL CIT ORDERS 273 
For example, the Department asserted that the plaintiffs may not bring an 
action to compel the Department to recommence its investigation, following 
publication of the lTC's revised affirmative injury determination, until the 
deadline for the Department's preliminary determination has passed. Thus, in 
the Jeannette Sheet Glass case, where (1) the plaintiff had been orally informed 
by a responsible official of the Commerce Department that no action would be 
taken on the case, (2) the relevant product had been removed from the De-
partment's internal list of products under investigation, and (3) the agency had 
failed to send questionnaires to the foreign producers as it must in order to 
perform its preliminary investigation, the Department insisted on appeal that 
plaintiff must wait two additional months-until the due date of the preliminary 
determination passed-before it could be considered aggrieved by agency ac-
tion.6g 
Such a position is not only disingenuous but is directly contrary to the agency's 
duty of upholding congressional intent by not delaying investigations of unfair 
trade practices. Where the agency is taking no action whatsoever to investigate 
unfair imports, it is ludicrous to assert that there could be a preliminary deter-
mination in the near future. In addition, as expected, the Department never 
issued a preliminary determination in Jeannette Sheet Glass or in the other cases 
reviewed. The Commerce Department's attempt to avoid its statutory respon-
sibility to reinitiate its investigation, coupled with its argument that plaintiffs 
cannot prove that they are aggrieved by the agency's non action until the pre-
liminary determination deadline has come and gone, represents a plain abdi-
cation of the agency's responsibility. 
The government has also asserted that if an action to contest the Commerce 
Department's determination is not commenced within thirty days from the date 
that determination is published, or within thirty days of the date the court 
enters judgment, the CIT does not have jurisdiction to review the Department's 
failure to investigate. 7o Both of these proposed periods for filing an action are 
absurd because plaintiff will not know at the times identified by the Department 
whether the Department will reinitiate its investigation. The government's po-
sition-refusing to inform plaintiffs officially whether it will perform its inves-
tigation and issue a preliminary determination, while at the same time insisting 
that plaintiffs file an appeal within thirty days of the court's order-places 
plaintiffs in an unwinnable position, with no recourse to address final agency 
action. The government's position is inconsistent with Congress' intent that final 
agency actions be subject to judicial review and is inexcusable coming from an 
69 See Memorandum in Support of Defendant"s Motion for Summary Judgment, Jeannette Sheet 
Glass Corp. v. United States, Court No. 85-10-01485. 
70 Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff"s Response to Motion to Affirm Agency Determination, Bingham & 
Taylor (No. 85-07-00909) at 6-7. 
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agency charged with vigorous enforcement of a law designed to protect domestic 
industries from unfair trade practices.7l 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In sum, sound policy and congressional intent require the Commerce De-
partment to recommence its investigation once the Court of International Trade 
overturns an ITC negative preliminary determination.72 The government's re-
sponsibility in these matters was best summed up in President Abraham Lin-
coln's First Message to Congress, which was cited by Judge Watson of the Court 
of International Trade in the American Grape Growers case: "It is as much the 
duty of government to render prompt justice against itself, in favor of its 
citizens, as it is to administer the same between private individuals."73 
The Commerce Department's failure to abide by the final decisions of the 
Court of International Trade breeds disrespect for the unfair trade laws and 
for the CIT. It should not be necessary for Congress to legislate on this issue. 
The CIT should reassert itself to ensure that its judgments are given the 
appropriate regard. 
71 See Ellis K. Orlowitz Co. v. United States, 47 Cust. Ct. 583, 587, A.R.D. 136 (1961). afl'd. 50 
C.C.P.A. 36 (1963) ("[T]he concern of Congress [in enacting the Antidumping Act] was to protect the 
producers of the United States against actual or threatened demoralization of American markets which 
could result from [dumped imports] ... "); City Lumber Co. v. United States. 64 Cust. Ct. 826. A.R.D. 
269.311 F. Supp. 340. 347 (1970). afl'd. 457 F.2d 991 (C.C.P.A. 1972). 
72 As a historical note. the original judicial review provisions of Title VII. as contained in the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979. permitted an appeal following a preliminary affirmative ITC decision. (The 
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 eliminated such "interlocutory" appeals of actions which do not terminate 
an investigation.) Under the original statute. an appeal of an affirmative preliminary ITC finding did 
not stop the parallel Commerce Department investigation pending resolution of the appeal. Why. 
then. should an appeal of an ITC affirmative preliminary determination reached after remand stall the 
parallel Commerce Department action? The relative postures of the cases are identical; there is a 
standing ITC preliminary affirmative finding. triggering a Commerce Department investigation. and 
there is an appeal. In both cases. the Commerce Department should begin its investigation regardless 
of the appeal. 
7' 622 F. Supp. at 298. 
